FREEDOM TO BE: ASSESSING THE CLAIMS OF LGBTQ ASYLUM SEEKERS

Douglas McDonald

In refugee status assessment, the process of proving the ‘truth’ of one’s sexual orientation (and proving that one will be persecuted on account of this) is often infected by the cultural biases of individual decision-makers. Assessors may, for example, expect self-identifying homosexual or bisexual asylum seekers to act in a particular manner (conforming to Western assumptions about sexual behaviour or identity), or expect an unreasonable degree of detail and consistency with regard to asylum seekers’ experiences in their countries of origin. Alternately, assessors may conflate various forms of sexual identity (such as homosexuality and transgender status, or different forms of sexual expression from other cultures) under the blanket label of ‘LGBT’ or ‘LGBTQ’ (and assess risks accordingly).

This paper assesses contemporary dilemmas in the assessment of asylum claims based upon sexual identity, including international legal challenges to previously prevailing notions that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (“LGBTQ”) asylum seekers may escape persecution through ‘discretion’; difficulties faced in credibility assessment; and the need for greater receptivity to diversity of lived sexual identities across cultural barriers. It draws upon the author’s own experiences as researcher for an Australian law firm specialising in refugee law and advocacy.

1 The author is a Consultant; Student, BA in Communications (Social Inquiry) / LLB, University of Technology, Sydney. The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views of his employers. Any errors are entirely the author’s own. The author may be contacted at douglas.mcdonald7190@gmail.com.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugees Convention") of 1951, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugees Protocol"), defines a 'refugee' as any person who, 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion', cannot return to their country of nationality. How this definition applies to the circumstances of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer persons ("LGBTQ") has been a source for continuing controversy – both in terms of whether LGBTQ individuals can, in fact, constitute a 'particular social group' and, if so, how the truthfulness of asylum seekers’ claims to belong to such groups can be determined.

Since the Netherlands’ 1981 recognition of LGBTQ individuals as potentially constituting a particular social group (and hence, in certain circumstances, a refugees group under the Refugees Convention), various Western nations, as well as the European Union, have followed suit. In recognizing that one’s sexual orientation is a protected characteristic under the Refugees Convention – as part of one’s membership of a particular social group – courts and policy-makers in these jurisdictions have also dispensed with the prior orthodoxy that sexual identity may be concealed, suppressed, or indeed discarded in order to escape detection or persecution. In such jurisdictions, refugee status assessors can no longer hold that applicants for asylum are not refugees due to their ability to remain ‘discrete’ if

2 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137.
4 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, article 1A(2).
6 See e.g. Appellant S395/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 216 CLR 473 (Austl., 2013); HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKSC 31 [UK, 2010]; Refugee Appeal no 75665/03 (NZ Refugee Status Appeals Authority, 2004).
removed to their countries of citizenship. However, the recognition that fears of harm based upon sexual identity may, in theory, give rise to protection under the Convention has not necessarily entailed greater rates of acceptance of LGBTQ asylum seekers. Instead, as Millbank notes, new hurdles have arisen; the fall of findings based upon discretion has brought with it 'a significant increase in decisions where the applicant's claim to actually being gay, lesbian or bisexual is outright rejected'.

Rejections of asylum seekers' claims to belong to sexual minorities are based upon various premises. Asylum seekers' claims may be rejected because their accounts of their experiences fail to comport with decision-makers' expectations as to how gay, lesbian, bisexual and/or transgender people in their own jurisdiction may view their own experiences or behave. Alternately, asylum seekers may appear to be unacceptably vague or inconsistent in their accounts of their experiences of harm (or the nature of their fears as to what will occur upon their return). Such 'inconsistencies' may include failure to raise fears of persecution on the basis of sexual identity until well after the applicant for protection has arrived in the jurisdiction in which they will eventually seek asylum, or even until after they have initially applied for a protection visa on other grounds. Furthermore, the 'demeanour' of an asylum seeker – how they present themselves, relate their experiences, and respond to questioning – may be found to be inconsistent with their claimed sexual identity or their claimed experiences, by decision-makers.

Credibility assessment is a necessary part of any conceivable model for determining whether individuals are 'refugees' under the Refugees Convention. Even though the extent of inquiry will vary, it is still necessary – in a context where applicants for protection will customarily lack documentary proof that

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9 Middelkoop, for example, proposes 'a shift in focus from assessing whether it is credible that the asylum seeker is gay to whether elements in the narrative indicate that the actors of persecution perceive him to be gay'; Louis Middelkoop, *Normativity and credibility of sexual orientation in asylum decision making. In Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum 154, 169* (Thomas Spijkerboer ed, 2013).
their claimed experiences have in fact occurred\(^\text{10}\) – for decision-makers to determine whether asylum seekers have, in fact, fled their home countries for the reasons that they have claimed. The methods that have been customarily employed in determining whether asylum seekers who claim to fear persecution on the basis of their sexual identity are, however, uniquely prone to error. They potentially rely upon culturally-specific notions of sexual identity and expression, impose unrealistic expectations as to memory, emotional responses and understanding of domestic immigration systems, and fail to account for diverse human experiences. In exercising discretion as to credibility – a form of finding notoriously open to 'personal judgment that is inconsistent from one adjudicator to the next'\(^\text{11}\) – there is a stark need for an acute understanding of the limits of a decision-maker's own perceptions and of the available information, and for reasonable and culturally-appropriate standards of assessment.

This essay, following a brief exploration of the legal context of asylum claims based upon sexual identity, discusses the potential shortcomings of credibility tests commonly employed by refugee status assessors internationally. It is based upon both academic research and the author's own experiences as a researcher involved in advocacy on behalf of individual applicants for refugee status in Australia,\(^\text{12}\) including on behalf of applicants fearing harm in their countries of origin on the basis of their LGBTQ identity.

**II. Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender People as Asylum Seekers: A Brief Overview**

In assessing the contemporary challenges faced by LGBTQ asylum seekers in proving their claims for protection, it is necessary to first establish how such


\(^{12}\) In Australia, 'protection visas' may be granted under section 36 of the *Migration Act* (1958) (Aus.) to (inter alia) non-citizens 'in respect of whom the Minister [for Immigration and Border Protection] is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol'.
claims came to be regarded as legitimate grounds for seeking asylum (in some jurisdictions). Many of the challenges faced by LGBTQ applicants for protection in earlier years (in establishing that they did, in fact, constitute a legitimate ‘particular social group’, and in proving that the forms of harm to which they were subject could in fact constitute persecution) remain relevant even after these early struggles have been ostensibly won, in that, the strains of thought which once denied the legitimacy of LGBTQ claims for asylum entirely exhibit many of the same false assumptions made by decision-makers in the present day.

The history of claims based upon sexuality in Australia prior to 2003 is representative in this respect. Traditionally, Australia’s Refugee Review Tribunal\(^\text{13}\) and Federal Court\(^\text{14}\) had found that ‘the capacity of an applicant to avoid persecutory harm’ was relevant to whether an applicant could be said to face a ‘real chance’\(^\text{5}\) of harm.\(^\text{6}\) Applying this line of reasoning, LGBTQ applicants were found not to face a real chance in circumstances where they could remain ‘discrete’ as to their sexuality – whether by relocating within their country of origin (to a new locale

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\(^{13}\) The Refugee Review Tribunal, established under section 457 of the Migration Act (1958) (Aus.), has power to review decisions (at first instance) of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection as to whether asylum seekers are eligible for protection visas under section 36 of the Migration Act. It is a ‘merits review’ body.

\(^{14}\) The Federal Court, established by section 5 of the Federal Court of Australia Act (1976) (Aus.), enjoys jurisdiction over, inter alia, migration law. At present, it hears appeals from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia; decisions of single judges of the Federal Court are appealable to the Full Bench of the Federal Court (constituted by a bench of three or five judges).

\(^{15}\) In Australia, whether a person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution requires that they face a ‘real chance’ of harm. See *Chan v. MIEA*, 169 CLR 379, 389 (Austl., 1989) (Mason CJ). A ‘real chance’ may exist even where ‘there is less than a fifty per cent chance of persecution occurring’ (Id.), or even where ‘there is only a 10 per cent chance that an applicant refugee status will be... persecuted’ (Id. at 429(McHugh J)).

where their previous profile would not be discovered)\(^{17}\) or by living ‘quietly without flaunting their homosexuality’\(^{18}\).

The flaws in this argument are both moral and practical. On a practical level, this line of reasoning denies that LGBTQ people ‘are entitled to enjoy the full range of fundamental human rights and freedoms’, instead assuming that they may legitimately be called upon to suppress an essential aspect of their identity in order to placate their persecutors.\(^{19}\) As New Zealand’s Refugee Status Appeals Authority has noted, decisions requiring that applicants for refugee status ‘abandon’ (in practice) their sexual identity, effectively require ‘the same submissive and compliant behaviour, the same denial of a fundamental human right’ of asylum seekers that ‘the agent of persecution in the country of origin seeks to achieve by persecutory conduct’.\(^{20}\) To identify one’s sexual conduct as distinguishable from one’s identity – and hence as unprotected by the Convention – falls within the same fallacy identified by Kennedy J in Lawrence v. Texas:\(^{21}\) to assume that ‘overt expression’ of one’s sexuality ‘in intimate conduct with another person’ is distinguishable from the nature of one’s relationships with other persons, a field in which humans may make free choices outside the appropriate scope of State or Court interference.\(^{22}\) One’s sexual conduct may legitimately form part of one’s ability to ‘define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life’.\(^{23}\)

Even beyond these moral qualms, the plausibility of requiring an asylum seeker to hide their sexual identity or behaviour from society or the authorities – or even to abstain from meaningful sexual activity altogether – is hardly self-

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\(^{17}\) Jenni Millbank, Sexual orientation and refugee status determination over the past 20 years: unsteady progress through standard sequences, in Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum33, 37 (Thomas Spijkerboer ed., 2013).


\(^{19}\) Millbank, supra note 17, at 33.

\(^{20}\) Refugee Appeal no 75665/03, para 114 (New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, 2004).


evident. In his decision in *HJ and HT*, Lord Rodger harshly criticises the implicit logic of this approach: ‘no-one would proceed on the basis that a straight man or woman could find it reasonably tolerable to conceal his or her sexual identity indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution’, nor would it be reasonably tolerable for a man or woman ‘to conceal his or her race indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution’. To extend such assumptions to gay men and lesbian women is, in Lord Rodger’s analysis, ‘equally unacceptable’.

In its decision in *S395/2002*, a majority of the High Court of Australia overturned prior decisions of the Federal Court in finding that ‘discretion’ is no defence where persecution is feared on the basis of sexuality. McHugh and Kirby JJ, for the majority, found that the Refugee Review Tribunal (in finding that the appellants, gay men from Bangladesh, had not previously suffered harm because they had ‘acted discretely’) had asked itself the wrong questions: it had not considered why the appellants had done so, or what may occur to them if they chose to ‘live openly in the same way as heterosexual people in Bangladesh live’. In doing so, McHugh and Kirby JJ issued a ringing call for tolerance (rare amongst the usually-legalistic and restrained judgments of the High Court): that ‘subject to the law, each person is free to associate with any other person and to act as he or she pleases, however much other individuals or groups may disapprove of that person’s associations or particular mode of life’. These principles, within McHugh and Kirby JJ’s judgment, lead inexorably to the conclusion that ‘subject to the law of the society in which they live, homosexuals as well as heterosexuals are free to associate with such persons as they wish and to live as they please’.

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24 *HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKSC 31*, para 76 (UK, 2010).
26 The High Court of Australia is Australia’s final court of appeal, as well as exercising original jurisdiction in constitutional cases. Its establishment was foreshadowed by section 71 of the *Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900* (UK), which states that ‘[t]he judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia’.
28 *Id.* at 491 (McHugh and Kirby JJ).
29 *Id.*
are only those which serve what can be classified ‘as a legitimate object of that country’.30

The High Court’s decision in S395/2002 was ‘the first decision of an ultimate appellate court anywhere in the world to deal with a claim for refugee status based on sexual orientation’.31 It has subsequently been followed by the UK Supreme Court’s decision in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) [2010].32 Despite the apparently seismic consequences of the recognition of sexual orientation as a protected characteristic under the Refugees Convention, the decision in S395 was not followed by a significant rise in the success rate for claims by sexual minority applicants. Instead, strikingly, reasons for rejecting such claims shifted from findings that LGBTQ applicants could remain ‘discreet’ to ‘arguments based on not believing that the applicant is an LGBTQ person’.33 The fate of the appellants in S395/2002 is emblematic in this respect; as Jenni Millbank notes, the appellants, upon being remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal, were found to have fabricated their claims to fear persecution on the basis of their sexual identity, and indeed not to be gay at all.34 The credibility of their claims had not been questioned at any earlier stage during the assessment process.

III. STEREOTYPES AND FALSE ASSUMPTIONS

In assessing asylum seekers’ credibility, assessors (in various jurisdictions) have frequently engaged in questionable assumptions about how LGBTQ people in other countries view themselves or express their sexuality. The cultural biases of decision-makers are significant in this respect; expectations of how LGBTQ asylum seekers ‘should’ behave are indelibly influenced by decision-makers’ own experiences and their legal, social and cultural contexts.

As Middelkoop notes, decision-makers frequently err in assuming that ‘western conceptions of sexuality’ – including Western models of homosexuality

30 Id.
31 Millbank, supra note a 8, at 391.
32 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKSC 31[UK, 2010].
33 Jansen, supra note 4, at 16.
34 Millbank, supra note 8, at 393-394.
identify formation - are universally applicable to sexual minorities from other countries. To this end, Middelkoop, drawing upon his research upon Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) procedures and decision-making in the Netherlands), records that applicants were regularly questioned upon their knowledge of 'gay culture', with applicants 'regularly expected to be able to tell about (inter)national gay rights organizations, local places where gay people meet, gay nightlife, famous gay persons, and movies and books that centre on homosexuality'. In the Australian context, Millbank quotes a notorious decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, cited in WAAG [2002]:

'The Tribunal attempted to gain insights into the Applicant’s outlook as a homosexual and the experiences and other phenomena that contributed to it. The Tribunal asked the Applicant which, if any, art, literature, song lyrics or popular culture icons spoke to him in isolation from the rest of society. The Applicant provided not one example. He said he did not understand the question. The Tribunal asked him if his ears pricked, say, when he heard of any famous, perhaps foreign artist, performer or author being banned in Iran for reasons of immorality. In reply, he said he did not understand the question. The Tribunal was not demanding that the Applicant be a leading Gide scholar or even a Marilyn Monroe fan, but it did seem odd that the sexuality he was forced to suppress in Iran did not find expression in any phenomena at all, whether in high culture or low, also considering that he claimed elsewhere to have been alert to what was happening in countries like Australia.'

To judge the credibility of LGBTQ applicants based upon their experiences in this respect risks silencing or marginalising the vast diversity of human sexual experience. Some LGBTQ asylum seekers, for instance, may engage in same-sex sexual conduct (as, for example, MSM) without identifying as LGBTQ. To expect them to be familiar with cultural or political figures, significant within a movement with which they do not identify, strains credulity. Furthermore, questions focusing
on gay nightlife or local sexual practices not only prioritise the claims of refugee claimants from certain regions within their country of origin (for example, individuals who have been raised in urban or relatively tolerant environments, where such LGBTQ communities may be able to develop to some degree, over claimants from rural areas excluded from active or long-term involvement with other LGBTQ individuals) but are uniquely prone to elicit inconsistent or vague answers simply by virtue of the embarrassment and shame many asylum seekers (who have experienced stigma and harassment on account of their sexuality throughout their life) may experience in recounting their knowledge of such practices.

Furthermore, the assumption that asylum seekers from nations which do possess LGBTQ communities and activists will be aware of the struggles of other individuals who share their sexual identities may fail to appreciate the effects of widespread (and internalized) homophobia. (As Middelkoop notes, applicants who suffer from internalized homophobia face particular difficulties in articulating their claims for protection, particularly given the tendency of such applicants to disclose their sexual orientation only at a late stage in the refugee assessment process. 38 Information on how to access support services or meet other LGBTQ people is by no means as widely available to asylum seekers (when in their countries of origin) as it may be to researchers and decision-makers in the countries in which they seek asylum; even if available, LGBTQ people who seek to suppress or deny their sexual identities may have no desire to seek out this further information.

IV. IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES: FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH DIFFERENT FORMS OF SEXUALITY

Through this paper, the general term ‘LGBTQ’ has been used to refer to individuals whose sexual identities and practices differ from heteronormative assumptions. While convenient as shorthand, however, the term ‘LGBTQ’ is potentially apt to mislead in the refugee assessment process. In this respect, culture is again relevant: Western decision-makers, prone to thinking of sexual minorities as uniformly marginalised (or, alternately, as subject to uniformly positive

38 Middelkoop, supra note 9, at 163.
treatment in some jurisdictions), may conflate various forms of sexual identity and thereby incorrectly assume that asylum-seekers will be subject to better treatment upon their return to their countries of origin than is, in fact, the case. This fallacy is particularly common in the interpretation of ‘independent country information’ about particular jurisdictions.

In particular, transsexual or transgender applicants’ claims have been conflated with those of other forms of sexual minorities, despite potentially stark differences in how they are treated in their countries of origin. In the principal US authority on the application of the Refugees Convention to transgender applicants, Hernandez-Montiel (2000), the particular social group of ‘gay men with female sexual identities’ was adopted (rather than an independent particular social group of ‘transgender women’). Berg and Millbank note that this failure to acknowledge ‘trans claimants as trans’ contributes to ‘the erasure of trans identity in legal texts and lawmaking’; further to this, Berg and Millbank note a problematic practice of characterizing transgender practices as a mere manifestation of other forms of sexual identity (such as same-sex attraction), rather than as a form of identity in its own right.

In Australia, although claims based upon transgender status have been considered in the past, an analysis of Refugee Review Tribunal authorities reflects continuing problematic rhetoric. Reflecting my own experiences (in advocacy on behalf of transgender asylum seekers), the Tribunal has used male pronouns for persons identifying as female. In its decision in 0902671 [2009], for example, the Tribunal acknowledges its failure to refer to an applicant by their preferred title of ‘Miss’, stating that ‘for the purposes of this decision the Tribunal has referred to the applicant as a male as that is the gender stated on the applicant’s passport’. In

41 Id.
43 0902671, RRTA 1053[Ref. Rev. Trib., 2009].
44 Id.
observing the constraints of strict legalism, the Tribunal has (unintentionally) trivialised the applicant’s claim and the source of her fear of persecution, imposing upon her the same gender identity which she has rejected. In using male pronouns, the Tribunal gives preference to the bureaucratic practices of the jurisdiction in question (from which the applicant sought protection) over the rights of the applicant to live, and to identify, in accordance with her own aspirations.

V. INCONSISTENCIES, VAGUENESS AND Demeanor

All asylum seekers are open to challenge – by assessors in the jurisdiction in which they have sought asylum – for the manner in which they choose to present their stories of persecution. Findings that asylum seekers have exaggerated or fabricated their claims for protection may arise for many reasons. Assessors may, for example, find that asylum seekers have provided inconsistent accounts (from interviewer to interviewer) of what has happened to them – whether in terms of the details of their claim (how many times they were attacked, how many attackers there were, dates and places) or in terms of the claim itself (with failure to raise a particular reason to fear harm at the earliest possible stage in the process taken as proof that it has been concocted as a show of desperation). Similarly, assessors may find that asylum seekers have been impermissibly vague in recounting particular incidents of trauma – for example, providing only very general descriptions of how events occurred and not providing further details upon prompting. Furthermore, an asylum seeker’s self-presentation and ability to answer questions may invite comment and criticism on multiple fronts. An asylum seeker who appears to ‘avoid the question’ or to provide rambling, irrelevant answers may be as easily suspected as an asylum seeker whose answers appear rehearsed and lacking in spontaneity, or who shows little emotion in recounting traumatic events.

Making findings of credibility on these grounds are problematic for all asylum seekers, in that they ignore the inevitable role played by memory lapses (particularly in recounting events of trauma and torture), difficulties in translation (both linguistic and cultural) and unfamiliarity with the interview process (and what information asylum seekers are expected to provide) in shaping how answers are formulated. As Rosemary Byrne has noted, decision-makers have consistently afforded probative weight to ‘consistent recall from serial interviews’ despite
scientific and medical skepticism as to the existence of any link between ‘credibility and accurate recall of traumatic experiences’.  

These aspects of ‘credibility assessment’ are, however, particularly devastating for LGBTQ asylum seekers. As Berg and Millbank note, claims for asylum based upon sexual orientation are distinguishable from other claims based upon experiences of torture and trauma by the fact that ‘extremely private experiences infuse all aspects of the claim’. Asylum seekers who have been raised in an environment where their sexuality is a source of shame or stigma, and where revelation of their sexual identities or experiences to decision-makers may expose them to harm, may be reluctant to reveal their claims or may deliberately conceal aspects of their experiences thought uniquely traumatic or embarrassing. In light of this, it is of particular concern that Middelkoop notes that refugee status assessors have been observed to ask ‘very intrusive questions into sexual contacts’, with asylum seekers ‘apparently expected to share [their] most intimate experiences during the interview’. Although the sources discussed below are often of general application, it must hence be borne in mind that the unique circumstances of LGBTQ asylum seekers render them of particular relevance to these claimants for protection.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s guidelines on the assessment of asylum seekers’ claims (‘the Handbook’) emphasise that decision-makers should assess applicants (in terms of their demeanor, the amount of detail they provide and the consistency of their claims) with due regard to the circumstances from which they have emerged. Applicants who have emerged from fearing the authorities in their own country ‘may... be afraid to speak freely and give a full and accurate account of [their] case’. In Australia, the Refugee Review Tribunal has stressed that these experiences of trauma may influence the recall and presentation of even applicants who fear non-state actors: ‘[a] person may have had traumatic experiences or be suffering from a disorder or illness which may

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47 Middelkoop, supra note 7, 160.
48 Handbook, supra note 8, para 198.
affect his or her ability to give evidence, his or her memory or ability to observe and recall specific details or events, which may also contribute to 'mistrust in speaking freely to persons in positions of authority'.

Inconsistencies are a problematic indicator of whether asylum seekers' accounts of their experiences are truthful, simply because the nature of such experiences - almost by definition, incidents of trauma and hardship - are inconsistent with consistent and accurate recall. Survivors of torture may suffer from memory blocks, disassociation and difficulty in concentrating, all of which compromise their ability to present a convincing narrative of their experiences (particularly within the often-traumatic format of an interview with a refugee status assessor). As Steel, Frommer and Silove write, '[t]raumatized asylum seekers often are unable to present a coherent trauma narrative to the decision-maker' simply by virtue of the consequences of their experiences; for instance, torture survivors' elevated rates of 'depression, anxiety, sleep disturbance, nightmares, impaired concentration and memory [and] PTSD' present significant barriers to the consistent and coherent recounting of experiences of hardship. Significantly, traumatic experiences impact both upon applicants' willingness to provide detailed accounts of their experiences (with varying openness to interviewers from instance to instance inevitably influencing the degree of detail provided) and their ability to do so. As Steel, Frommer and Silove note:

'Because traumatic memories are encoded while an individual is experiencing extreme anxiety, the normal processing and integration of these experiences is disrupted... Instead of being encoded into memory in an organized, coherent and integrated manner, traumatic experiences are often encoded in a disorganized and fragmented manner...'

52 Id. at 515.
53 Id. at 517.
Beyond issues encountered in the encoding of memories, the nature of asylum seekers' recall is similarly context-specific. Writing in the British Medical Journal, Herlily, Scragg and Turner note that 'depressed patients are biased towards recalling negative personal memories in favour of positive ones', and may suffer from 'difficulties in retrieving specific autobiographical memories'.\(^{54}\) They present the example of an asylum seeker's description of his treatment varying from 'we were slapped around' to (when recounting the incident in question on another occasion) 'we were badly beaten'; whereas a discrepancy of this kind may be mistaken by a decision-maker for an asylum seeker exaggerating their experiences (or even recounting a concocted experience, and failing to remain consistent about imaginary details), Herlily, Scragg and Turner suggest that instead the asylum seeker 'may simply have been in a different mood state in each interview, thus giving different evaluations of his experience'.\(^{56}\)

In its report *Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems*, the UNHCR has similarly emphasized the need for decision-makers 'to have realistic expectations of what an applicant should know and remember' in light of the natural limitations of human memory, particularly in cases of trauma. The report notes that 'inconsistency, loss of detail and gaps in recall are a natural phenomenon of the way a person records, stores and retrieves memories'.\(^{57}\) The degree of detail provided by asylum seekers – both in total and between varying occasions – will depend upon a great many factors, and cannot be attributed to a desire to mislead or fabricate claims without further consideration; for example, memories which have been repeatedly recalled may exhibit greater details, whereas separate incidents may become fused as '[b]lended or generic memories'.\(^{58}\) Juliet Cohen has similarly testified that '[p]articularly with repeated experiences, information specific to one episode tends to drop out while information common to

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\(^{55}\) *Id.* at 326-327.

\(^{56}\) *Id.*


\(^{58}\) *Id.* at 58.
other similar episodes is incorporated into the general schema and retained’, forming ‘a kind of blended memory’.

The UNHCR further cautions that ‘[a] person’s recall of dates, frequency and duration is nearly always reconstructed from inference, estimation and guesswork’.

In light of the above, it must be consistently borne in mind in assessing LGBTQ asylum seekers that inconsistent, late or vague claims are not necessarily untrue, and should not be judged to be false simply because they are inconsistent, late or vague. Given the extremely serious consequences that may transpire from a negative finding (including the potential exposure of an unsuccessful applicant to detention, torture or death), a finding that any asylum seeker, but particularly an LGBTQ asylum seeker, is lying about an aspect of their claims must never be made lightly: it should only be reached where a far broader range of indicia point to this conclusion, and where other explanations for discrepancies are not satisfactory. Middleton J’s observation in SZLVZ [2008] that refugee status assessors ‘must be sensitive to the difficulties often faced by applicants and should give the benefit of the doubt to those who are generally credible, but are unable to substantiate all of their claims’ arguably retains its relevance beyond circumstances where there is a lack of corroborating evidence; its call for ‘the benefit of the doubt’ should similarly inform the amount of weight decision-makers afford to inconsistencies and ‘vagueness’.

An applicant’s demeanor is similarly an inexact guide to the truth of their claims to fear persecution on the basis of LGBTQ conduct or identity. This is true both with regard to their general effect and how they recount traumatic experiences. As noted above, LGBTQ individuals cannot be expected to act in a manner reminiscent of Western stereotypes. Even in positive decisions, such as that in 0805932 [2008], the Refugee Review Tribunal has commented that applicants possess ‘physical characteristics that would identify [them] as homosexual and effeminate’.

An asylum seeker who identifies as LGBTQ – or who has engaged

60 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 57, at 154.
62 0805932, RRTA 442 [Ref. Rev. Trib., 2008].
in LGBTQ conduct – in a context where such behaviour and identities are stigmatised and repressed cannot be expected to present in a manner that readily conforms to contemporary Western assumptions.

More broadly – and in common with asylum seekers applying for protection on other grounds – the failure by LGBTQ asylum seekers to exhibit particular emotional responses when recounting their experiences (such as overt grief or hesitation) cannot necessarily be regarded as evidence that these experiences are fabricated. As Joanna Ruppel writes, '[t]he manner in which individuals respond to questions may... be influenced by culture', what would be perceived in a Western context as an evasive or unduly taciturn response may be eminently justified by the cultural norms of the asylum seeker, particularly one who has learned in their country of origin to 'volunteer nothing to people in uniforms' (or to otherwise distrust figures of authority, choosing not to show weakness or to 'give too much away'). Individual experiences of trauma differ; a flat effect or seeming detachment from the events related may owe as much to experiences of disassociation, or even excessive rehearsal prior to presenting one's account of one's experiences (in light of the dire consequences of failure), as to any attempt to mislead refugee status assessors.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As was bluntly asserted by Lord Rodger in HJ and HT, LGBTQ people are protected under the Convention, properly interpreted, because 'they are entitled to have the same freedom from fear of persecution as their straight counterparts'. This ringing declaration can only be observed in practice, however, if LGBTQ asylum seekers' claims to belong to sexual minorities, and to fear harm as a result, are believed by the people responsible for deciding the fate of their claims. In light of this, it is of concern that decision-makers have frequently approached this unique subset of claims without regard to differences of cultures and distinct

64 Id.
65 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKSC 31, para 76(UK, 2010) (Lord Rodger).
forms of sexual identity, and without giving sufficient weight to the fallibility of human memory (particularly when relating circumstances of trauma, and especially in the unusual, artificial format of a refugee assessment interview).

As noted earlier, it is essential to conduct some form of credibility assessment in determining the outcome of asylum seekers' claims – whether with regard to their sexuality or (as Middelkoop would prefer) as to what has transpired in their countries of origin. The degree of weight to be afforded to matters which go to applicants' credibility in individual circumstances is difficult to mandate through statutes, precedents or policies; it will depend to a great extent upon the circumstances of individual cases. Despite this, the need for sensitivity and understanding – for the challenges faced by asylum seekers in telling their stories, for the unique plight of LGBTQ asylum seekers (particularly those who have seldom or never before spoken of their sexuality and their experiences) and in the interpretation of information about their countries of origin – in determining asylum seekers' claims under the Refugees Convention must always be paramount.